


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REGIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS

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
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The Central Committee Apparatus: Trend Toward
Promotion From Within

The Central Committee apparatus is the support staff of the party Secretariat. It helps to administer the party's affairs, including personnel assignments, and to check on the implementation of party decisions. Stalin and Khrushchev used their control over appointments to the Central Committee staff to strengthen their influence in the party apparatus as a whole. Under General Secretary Brezhnev, however, once Khrushchev's proteges had been purged from the central apparatus, a majority of appointments to its top posts have been based on qualifications and experience rather than on personal patronage, with preference for staff members of the Central Committee departments.

There are 22 departments in the Central Committee apparatus. Each department has a chief, a first deputy chief, numerous deputy chiefs, and large staffs. Seventy-eight people are at present publicly identified as chief, first deputy chief, or deputy chief of a Central Committee department. Over half of these were promoted from within the department with which they are identified. The others were brought into the department, the majority having worked in an area that qualified them to perform the department's functions. A. N. Frolov, for example, had government experience as a deputy minister of the food industry prior to his appointment as a deputy chief of the Light and Food Industry Department. Others, like G. S. Pavlov, administrator of the Administration of Affairs, worked in the Central Committee apparatus in some other job before appointment to the department.

Of the 78 identified senior officials of the Central Committee apparatus, 27 were appointed to their jobs from positions outside the department. Two had been working elsewhere in the Central Committee apparatus and 10 in the government, while 15 were party secretaries in the regional apparatus prior to their appointment.

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Eighteen department chiefs have been publicly identified. Seven were promoted from within the department for which they became chief, and 11 were recruited from outside. Of these, eight had prior party experience and three had worked in similar jobs for the government.


Appointments to the post of first deputy chief have been even more strongly based on qualifications and experience. Of the 16 first deputy chiefs that have been publicly identified, 14 were promoted from within the department and two were brought in to the apparatus from the government. It seems likely that the first deputy chief, even more than the chief or the deputy chiefs, provides the experience needed to maintain continuity in the work of each department.

There are 45 publicly identified deputy chiefs.* Twenty rose from within the department and 15 were first brought into the department as a deputy chief. Of these 15, 10 came from the party apparatus and five from the government apparatus. It would appear, then, that recruitment from outside into the higher levels of the Central Committee staff is most often accomplished at the level of deputy chief.

These statistics establish a pattern of bureaucratic promotion from within the departments that will probably continue to be followed so long as Brezhnev remains General Secretary. His successor in that office, however, may find it necessary to appoint numerous proteges to the top positions in the Central Committee apparatus if he wants to dominate the party as Khrushchev did.

*We have no information on the previous job experience of 10 of the deputy chiefs.


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
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Soviet Commercial Visitor Highlights: January-June 1977

Day-to-day US-Soviet commercial relations during the first 6 months of 1977 appeared somewhat strained. Although about 544 Soviet commercial visits to the US were authorized, only slightly less than the 559 for the same period in 1976, some disaffection with the progress of negotiations was evident.




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Information is still lacking on how well the Soviets have been able to assimilate and diffuse the technologies they purchase from Western countries. Most of the Soviet commercial visitors during the first half of the year were here to inspect and receive documents, undergo industrial training, or otherwise take part in negotiations. That fact may reflect a growing Soviet awareness that the benefits of acquiring US technology are proportional to the amount of training and management knowhow they acquire. The predominance of such visits also suggests that the Soviets are initiating few new projects that show a serious intent to make immediate investment, but are interested rather in access to information that is available.


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The Soviet currency crisis continues, with deals falling through because of lack of funds. The Soviets are placing heavy emphasis on whatever might bring in hard currency in any amounts: Several delegations were here to peddle copyrights, licenses, patents, Olympic stamps and coins, and postcards. Litsenzintorg, the Soviet all-union agency that handles the export and import of patents, was represented at the Chicago World Fair of Technology Exchange in February by a deputy chairman, Boris Kurakin. In the past, Litsenzintorg has been a good barometer of Soviet intentions to buy or sell technology. Two other representatives, one also a deputy chairman, visited several US companies in March. Vladimir Gorbunov, a department chairman of the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry, attended a meeting of the American Association of Corporate Patent Counsels. High-level Soviet commercial visitors during the first half of 1977 were few:


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In keeping with the Party's announced intentions to improve the quality of the average Soviet citizen's life, many Soviet commercial visitors were seeking the where-withal to produce consumer amenities

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Negotiations seem to be characterized by more sophistication and less enthusiasm on the part of US negotiators and by deteriorating hopes of a much improved economic atmosphere on the part of the Soviets. The emotional assertion by Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev during his June visit to the US that the Soviet Union could do without US technology reveals mounting frustration over the lack of most favored nation status and may portend stepped-up efforts by the Soviets to acquire needed technology from other Western countries and Japan. In addition, monies for new Soviet investment and business ventures abroad were reported frozen as of March 1, 1977. A recent excuse offered by the Soviets is that the availability of funds for the civilian sector during the second half of the year awaits the outcome of the SALT talks.

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